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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES
ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES:
PRINCIPLES AND PLANNED MEASURES
by
Charles .B. Bourne*
International law governing the utilization of
transfrontier waters has been evolving slowly, for the most
part since about 1950, and the process is incomplete; there
is still uncertainty about its basic elements. The
International Law Commission (ILC) has now made a notable
contribution to that evolution by its adoption on first
reading of a set of Draft Articles on The Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, a topic
that has been on its agenda since 1971 (1). It has
transmitted these articles through the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to governments with the request for their
comments and observations to be submitted by January 1, 1993
(2). The responses of governments will give some measure of
the extent to which the provisions of the Draft Articles
will be accepted by states as law.
2.
In its work the ILC has recognized that the
characteristics of a watercourse are often unique and that
the rational use of its waters may require different
solutions from those required elsewhere. It has therefore
designed the Draft Articles as a framework agreement whose
rules can be set aside by the agreement of the watercourse
states concerned (3). This flexibility, however, calls into
question whether there is any firm body of customary
international law on water reources. Are international
watercourse states free to do as they please with the waters
in their territories? Or are there some rules of customary
law that they cannot put aside? To what extent do the Draft
Articles embody rules of customary international law? These
questions should be borne in mind.
Only Part II of the Draft Articles, entitled General
Principles, and Part III, entitled Planned Measures, will be
considered here. Part II will be dealt with first, for its
provisions prescribe the procedural rules that states must
follow in approaching the utilization of the waters of an
international watercourse, and, if proper procedural steps
are followed, questions of legal entitlement, liability for
harm, compensation, and so forth will arise later, if at
all.
grocedural rules
The procedural rules proposed by the ILC are found in
Draft Articles 11 to 19. They begin by stating the
obligation of watercourse states to "exchange information
and consult each other on the possible effects of planned
measures on the condition" of the watercourse (Article 11).
They then set forth in some detail the steps that a
watercourse state must take before it implements or permits
the implementation of measures that may have "an appreciable
adverse effect" on other watercourse states. In particular,
it must give timely notice thereof which "should be
accompanied by available technical data and information"
(Article 12); it must allow the notified state six months to
study the matter (Article 13) and during that period it must
provide any requested additional information that is
"available and necessary for an accurate evaluation" of the
planned measures and not implement them (Article 14); and it
must enter into consultations and negotiations with the
notified state if, within the six month period referred to
in Article 13, that state objects to the measures on the
ground that its rights under Articles 5 (equitable
utilization) or 7 (appreciable harm) will be affected
(Articles 15 and 17).
The obligation to enter into consultations and
negotiations will also arise if a watercourse state has
serious reason to believe that measures planned by another
watercourse state, of which it has not been notified by that
state, may have an appreciable adverse effect upon it and
requests that state to comply with the provisions of the
Draft Articles concerning notice, the exchange of data, and
consultation and negotiation (Article 18).
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There are three exceptions to the above rules. Under
Article 19, a watercourse state may immediately proceed to
implement measures that are "of the utmost urgency in order
to protect public health, public safety or other equally
important interests." In this case, however, it must
transmit to the other watercourse states a formal
declaration of the urgency of the measures together with
relevant data and information; thereafter the normal
requirements for consultation and negotiation apply.
The second exception is similar to the first but wider
in scope; it is found in Article 25 dealing with an
emergency, which is defined as "a situation that causes, or
poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to ...
other states and that results from natural causes ... or
from human conduct ...." The article provides that "a
watercourse state shall, without delay and by the most
expeditious means available, notify other potentially
affected states and competent international organizations of
any emergency originating within its territory" and shall,
in cooperation with them, "immediately take all practicable
measures ... to prevent, mitigate and elimate harmful
effects of the emergency." A notable feature of this
article is that the obligations it imposes extends not only
to other watercourse states but also to other states; it
thus departs from the purpose of the Framework Agreement to
enunciate rules governing the relations of watercourse
states.
5.
The third exception from the procedural rules governing
planned measures is provided for in Article 31. Under it a
watercourse state is excused from providing data or
information that is vital to its national defence or
security. In this case, as in the case of the exceptions
mentioned above, the normal substantive rules about
equitable utilization and prohibition of harm will, of
course, apply to any measures that may be implemented.
A notified state is required to communicate its finding
about the planned measures in accordance with Article 15,
that is, within the six month period allowed for study and
with the required "documented explanation setting forth the
reasons for the finding." If it fails to do so, the
notifying state may then proceed to implement its measures
in accordance with the notification and any other data and
information provided to the notified state, but it will do
so "subject to its obligations under articles 5 and 7"
(Article 16). According to this provision, therefore, the
failure of a notified state to object to or otherwise
respond to the notice of the planned measures within the
prescribed time has no prejudicial effect on that state's
rights; in particular, its silence cannot be treated as its
consent to the measures. The ILC, in its commentary on
Article 16, expresses the view that the silence of the
notified state has some effect; it precludes that state
"from claiming the benefits of the protective regime
contained in Part III," that is, the benefits of the
6.
procedural rules relating to planned measures (4 ). This
self-imposed loss of procedural safeguards, however, can
hardly be regarded as a significant sanction; the reality is
that the notified state's substantive rights are not
affected in any way.
This position is not satisfactory. By not providing
for a substantive sanction for a failure to respond to a
notice of planned measures, the Draft Articles do not give
any incentive to a notified state to engage in the process
that offers the best chance of equitable and reasonable
solutions to the complex problems inherent in the
utilization of international water resources. Furthermore,
it would seem unfair to the state that has given due notice 	
(Th
of its planned measures. In the first place, if objection
to its planned measures is not made within the prescribed
time, it is deprived of the opportunity to meet objections
to its plans, by clarifying or modifying them so that they
do not infringe the legal rights of other watercourse
states. And second, as Article 16 expressly provides, in
proceeding with the implementation, it -remains subject to
its obligations under the substantive law of Articles 5 and
7. In other words, it must either delay implementation of
its planned measures, or proceed to implement them, thus
running the risk of incurring uncertain legal liability if
harm results. It might justly ask why it should not be a
good defence to a subsequent claim by the unresponsive
7.
notified state that its silence amounted to tacit consent to
the implementation of the measures in question (5).
It is true that the Draft Articles do not impose any
special sanction on a watercourse state for failing to
comply with the provisions respecting notice, the giving of
data and other information, and consultation and
negotiation. At one stage, Professor S. McCaffrey, the
fourth Special Rapporteur on the topic, proposed to the ILC
the following draft article : "If a State fails to provide
notification ..., it shall incur liability for any harm
caused to other States by the new use, whether or not such
harm is in violation of article 191 (emphasis added). He
said that he had included it on the assumption that article
[9], now article 7 in the Draft Articles, which prohibits
causing appreciable harm to other watercourse states, would
be reformulated to take into account the distinction between
factual "harm" and legal "injury" as he had recommended in
his Second Report (6). This assumption proved false and the
proposed article was dropped; it became redundant once a
watercourse state was made liable for any appreciable harm,
not merely legal injury (7).
There is, then, a lack of balance in the treatment of
the notifying state and the notified state for failure to
comply with the required procedures; for, while the former
remains legally bound by all provisions of the Draft
Articles, the latter may ignore the procedural rules with
impunity. In the circumstances, when a notified state does
(Th
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not respond to the notice in due time, it should thereafter
be estopped from raising claims under Article 5 (equitable
utilization) or Article 7 (appreciable harm) as a result of
the implementation of the measures in question.
The time at which a watercourse state is obliged to
give notice of its planned measures and to comply with the
other procedural rules, has been in the past a matter of
differing opinions (8). Should the obligation arise only
when the implementation of a measure may have a serious
adverse effect on another watercourse state? Or a
significant or appreciable adverse effect? Or merely some
effect? Or even if it is thought that the implementation
will have no effect? The problem is that only the state
planning a measure knows precisely what it has in mind and
is in the best position to judge its effect on the other
states; but its opinion in the matter will be subjective, as
it will be based on its view of the facts, which may be
incomplete. With the best of intentions, it may find it
difficult and at times impossible to determine on its own
what the effect of the measure will be.
In these circumstances, it is tempting to argue for the
adoption of the widest rule for bringing the procedural
rules into play, so that judgments about the effects of
implementing the planned measures will be based on facts as
seen from the viewpoint of all concerned parties. This
idealistic view, however, has had little support, for it
would involve the costs and delays in giving notice and
9 .
exchanging data, although it is clear that the proposed
measure will have no effect whatever on other states. On
the other hand, the adoption of a "serious effect" rule for
the initiation of the procedures has had diminishing
support; it is seen as narrowing too strictly the
opportunity of watercourse states to assess and raise timely
objections to proposed measures.
The desirable rule, therefore, should fall between the
two extremes of notice of all planned measures and notice
only of measures that may have serious effects. The
position taken by the ILC in Draft Article 12 is that notice
of planned measures must be given only when their
implementation may have an "appreciable adverse effect" upon
other watercourse states. In its commentary on this
article, it points out that "The threshold established by
this standard is intended to be lower than that of
'appreciable harm' under article [7]. Thus, an 'appreciable
adverse effect' may not rise to the level of 'appreciable
harm' within the meaning of article [7]. 'Appreciable harm'
is not an appropriate standard for the setting in motion of
the procedures ..." (9). This solution is commendable. It
is important that the process for reconciling the
conflicting interests of watercourse states should begin
early in the planning of utilizations of the waters of an
international watercourse.
The meaning of the words "appreciable adverse effect
upon other watercourse states" in Article 12 is not
10.
altogether certain. They clearly encompass effects upon the
existing state of affairs, but what about effects on the
possible future developments in the other states? The
implementation of a measure now may, on becoming an existing
use, preclude a future utilization of the waters by others.
Article 17, paragraph 2, expressly provides that, in the
consultations and negotiations subsequent to the giving of
notice, "each state must in good faith pay reasonable regard
to the rights and legitimate interests of the other state."
1
Is the possibility of the future use of the waters in its
territory not a "legitimate interest" of the state which
must be taken into account in the application of Article 12?
The answer to this question is almost certainly no. The
future uses, at least those that are not being planned, are
speculative and cannot be assessed with any precision. It
is not practical or reasonable to Complicate and perhaps
delay the implementation of present plans on the ground that
something may be done at some unspecified future time.
This is not to say that the Draft Articles do not pose
serious difficulties for watercourse states whose future
interests are not taken into account before present measures
are implemented. As shall be seen below, the ILC has made
the prohibition of "appreciable harm" the primary rule in
the law of international watercourses. Consequently, in the
absence of agreement between the watercourse states
concerned, a utilization undertaken now will thereafter be
immune from appreciable harm by the subsequent utilizations
11.
of other states.	 The law is slanted in favour of the
earlier developer. The only possible solace for the state
concerned about its right to a reasonable and equitable
share of the beneficial use of the waters of an
international watercourse in the future is found in Article
9, one of the general principles, which requires watercourse
states to exchange on a regular basis data and information
about the condition of the watercourse, and in Article 11
which requires the states to exchange information and
consult each other on the possible effects of planned
measures on the condition of the watercourse. With a
constant flow of information, a state may have some chance
of protecting not only its present but also its future
interests (10).
subject to the above comments, Part III of the Draft
Articles set forth an admirable set out procedures to be
followed by watercourse states. For the most part, the
basic requirements of the exchange of information, notice,
consultation, and negotiation now form part of customary
international law (11). In fleshing out these basic rules,
such as providinf for a six month time limit, the ILC has
engaged in beneficial progressive development of the law.
What it has done, however, is not in any sense radical; the
new provisions are merely extensions of the basic rules to
make them effective and can be seen as implicit in them.
Insofar as these provisions constitute new law, they should
12.
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have little difficulty in gaining ready acceptance by the
international community.
Substantive rules 
Notions about the legal rights and obligations of
watercourse states undoubtedly influence the attitudes of
these states in their dealings with each other concerning
the utilization of a watercourse and thus play an important
part in their decisions about it. In advancing their own
interests, they may invoke international law. It will, of
course, be a nationalistic version of that law, ranging from
the territorial sovereignty theory of the Harmon doctrine
kind to the theory that the consent of a watercourse state
is needed for any utilization of waters that might adversely
affect it. Instances of resort to theories at extreme ends
of the legal spectrum abound; the arguments of India and
Pakistan in their dispute over the Indus river during the
1950/s are a notable example (12). In the end, however,
states almost always settle their international watercourse
disputes by agreement, their legal claims and arguments
having been mainly bargaining ploys.
The task of the ILC has been to discern the principles
of international law that have emerged from the welter of
legal claims and counter-claims made by states about their
utilizations of international watercourses, to codify these
principles, and to contribute to their progressive
development. The result of its labours, under the tutelage
	 tTh
of four Special Rapporteurs during the past twenty years, is
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now presented in the Draft Articles, Part II of which,
composed of Articles 5 to 10, sets forth the general
principles of law on the subject.
Articles 8, 9, and 10 are not controversial and call
for little comment. The first imposes a general obligation
on watercourse states to co-operate "in order to attain
optimal utilization and adequate protection of an
international watercourse." Article 9 is procedural,
providing for the exchange "on a regular basis ... [of]
reasonably available data and information on the condition
of the watercourse"; it thus complements the procedural
provisions in the subsequent articles discussed above, but
the obligation under it is a continuing one, not tied to the
implementation of planned measures. Article 10, on the
other hand, is substantive; it provides that, "in the
absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over
other uses." This principle is generally accepted. For
example, Article 6 of the Helsinki Rules expresses the
principle in similar words.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 purport to express the fundamental
principles of international law that define the rights and
duties of watercourse states, while the Draft Articles
considered above are merely adjuncts to them, providing
guidelines for states so that they may act in conformity
with their obligations under these principles. 	 The
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evolution of Articles 5 and 7 in the proceedings of the ILC
merits particular attention.
The initial attempt in the ILC to formulate the basic
principles of international water law was made in 1981 by
the Second Special Rapporteur, Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel; in
his Third Report, he presented an exhaustive study of the
subject and proposed a number of articles for the
consideration. Two of them were fundamental. In his draft
article 6, he accepted the principle of equitable
utiliztion, stating the essence of that principle thus:
"Without its consent, a State may not be denied its
equitable participation in the utilization of the waters of
an international watercourse system of which it is a system
State" (13). And he made it clear in unequivocal language
in draft article 8, entitled "responsibility for appreciable
harm," that equitable utilization is the primary principle
of international water law. Paragraph 1 of that article is
as follows: "The right of a system State to use the water
resources of an international watercourse system is limited
by the duty not to cause appreciable harm to the interests
of another system State, except as may be allowable under a
determination for equitable participation for the
international watercourse system involved" (14). For Judge
Schwebel (a member of the International Court of Justice
since 1981), then, the principle of "no appreciable harm"
must on occasion yield to that of equitable utilization. In
substance, appreciable harm is not the decisive factor in
15.
determining the legality of a utilization of the waters of
an international watercourse, though it is a very important,
and undoubtedly often will be the overriding, factor in that
determination.
Mr. Jens Evensen (now also a judge of the International
Court of Justice) succeeded Judge Schwebel as Special
Rapporteur in 1982. In his First Report to the ILC in 1983,
he produced a draft convention of 39 articles. Like Judge
Schwebel, he strongly endorsed the principle of equitable
utilization, saying:
"This basic principle as laid down in the proposed
[Schwebel] article 6 is a codification of prevailing
principles of international law following from customary
international law as evidenced by comprehensive State
practice, general principles of law ... and also following
from the very nature of things.... The task of the
International Law Commission in drafting these articles must
first and foremost be to draft principles, some of them of
an obligatory nature, by codifying already established
international law principles; others as legal ideas of a
more progressive nature as guidelines.... In the respectful
opinion of the Special Rapporteur, the provisions laid down
in article 7 [on equitable utilization] belong to the first
category of principles" (15).
Judge Evensen expressed the principle in article 6 of his
revised draft articles of 1984 in the following terms: *
16.
"1. A watercourse State is, within its territory, entitled
to a reasonable and equitable share of the uses of the
waters of an international watercourse.
"2. To the extent that the use of the waters of an
international watercourse within the territory of one
watercourse State affects the use of the waters of the
watercourse in the territory of another watercourse State,
the watercourse States concerned shall share in the use of
the waters ... in a reasonable and equitable manner in
accordance with the articles of the present Convention..."
(16).
Turning to the no appreciable harm rule, Judge Evensen
radically changed the manner in which Judge Schwebel had
dealt with it; he omitted the exception clause. His new
article 9, as revised in 1984, read as follows: "A
watercourse State shall refrain from and prevent (within its
jurisdiction) uses or activities with regard to an
international watercourse that may cause appreciable harm to
the rights or interests of other watercourse States, unless
otherwise provided for in a watercourse agreement or other
arrangement" (17). In short, notwithstanding his
endorsement of equitable utilization, Judge Jensen made "no
appreciable harm" the dominant rule, one not to yield to
considerations of equity and reasonableness in the sharing
of the uses of the waters.
A major change of this importance needs to be
justified, but this is lacking in Judge Evensen's First
tTh
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Report.	 In his commentary on article 9, he made no
reference to the Schwebel formulation of the article and
disposed of the issue in two short paragraphs (18). He
began with this categorical statement: "The principle laid
down in article 9 is a basic rule of international law
pertaining to international watercourse systems. Thus it is
a codification of an established principle of international
law." He then quoted the first paragraph of Article 10 of
the Helsinki Rules dealing with pollution; he seemed to find
some comfort in this article even though it begins with
these words: "Consistent with the principle of equitable
utilization of the waters of an international drainaae
(..b\ basin, a State (a) must prevent ... water pollution ...which
would cause substantial injury" (emphasis added, the
substance of this clause being identical with that used by
Judge Schwebel to qualify the no appreciable harm provision
in his draft article 8). Judge Evensen followed this with
the observation that the issue had been dealt with in a
number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and then
quoted Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.
He concluded with a short statement on the choice of the
words "appreciable harm," agreeing with Judge Schwebel on
this point. These few remarks cannot be regarded as an
adequate or convincing justification for subordinating the
equitable utilization rule to that of no appreciable harm.
In his Second Report, Judge Evensen did not add to them; he
18 .
merely remarked that the comments on the article in his
First Report were generally applicable.
When Professor Stephen C. McCaffrey succeeded Judge
Evensen as Special Rapporteur on the topic in 1985,
therefore, he inherited two sets of draft articles that
reflected a fundamental difference of opinion on the
substance of the basic principle of international water
resources law. Ultimately, after considerable wrestling
with the problem, the ILC accepted the view of Judge Evensen
and it is incorporated in the Draft Articles now under
consideration.
In these articles, equitable utilization is dealt with
in Draft Article 5, which provides as follows:
"1.	 Watercourse States shall in their respective
territories utilize an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an
international watercourse shall be used and developed by
watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with
adequate protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use,
development and protection of an international watercourse
in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation
includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the
duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof,
as provided in the present articles."
	 PTh
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The no appreciable harm rule is set forth in Draft Article 7
which simply states that "Watercourse States shall utilize
an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause
appreciable harm to other watercourse States."
Unlike Judge Evensen, Professor McCaffrey discussed
carefully in his reports to the ILC and at its sessions the
relationship between the equitable utilization and no
appreciable harm principles. The views he expressed there
and the justification advanced by the ILC for the adoption
of Draft Articles 5 and 7 must be examined closely in order
to understand the intended meaning of the language of these
articles and their effect, and to judge the extent to which
they are, or should be, part of international law.
At the outset Professor McCaffrey supported the
position taken by Judge Schwebel on the relationship of the
two principles. For example, in the discussion of Judge
Evensen's draft articles at the 1984 session of the ILC, he
is reported to have said:
"Draft article 9, which prohibited activities that might
'cause appreciable harm,' should be reconsidered. It would
be more appropriate to proscribe 'exceeding a State's
equitable share' or 'depriving another State of its
equitableshare' of the benefits of the waters of an
international watercourse. Another solution ... would be to
revert to the formula ... proposed by the previous Special
Rapporteur [Schwebel] in this third report.... It was
implicit in the concept of an equitable allocation of
20.
benefits that probably neither party would get all it
wanted.... The 'no harm' rule seemed in effect to create a
prior appropriation system that could result in a far from
equitable division of benefits.... In any event, a rule to
the effect that a State could not exceed its equitable
share, or deprive another State of its equitable share,
would present far fewer difficultis than the rule that a
State must not cause appreciable harm...." (19).
These views were not accepted by all members of the ILC. In
fact, in the deliberations on the matter, opinions varied
considerably, some agreeing with Professor McCaffrey and
some with Judge Evensen (20).
In 1986 in his Second Report, Professor McCaffrey again
confronted the conflict between the Evensen draft articles 6
and 9 dealing with the concepts of equitable utilization and
no appreciable harm respectively. He was unable to
reconcile them as they stood. He concluded, however, from a
"survey of all the available evidence of the general
practice of States, accepted as law" that "there is
overwhelming support for the doctrine of equitable
utilization as a general, guiding principle of law for the
determination of the rights" of watercourse states (21), and
he was therefore unwilling to change article 6.
As for article 9, in what seems to have been an attempt
to meet the arguments of its proponents who held the view
that the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas maxim was the
fount of all international law, certainly of the law
21.
governing the relations of watercourse states, Professor
McCaffrey stated that "the bedrock upon which the doctrine
of equitable utilization is founded is the fundamental
principle represented by the maxim sic utere ...." At first
glance this statement is startling, but it soon becomes
apparent that his understanding of the maxim at that time
was profoundly different from that of the supporters of
article 9 as formulated by Judge Evensen. For him, the
maxim prescribes not harm but injury to other states. As he
said: "Crucial to an understanding of the latter statement,
and indeed of the doctrine of equitable utilization in
general, is an appreciation of the meaning of the term
'injury' in the context: the term is used in its legal, as
opposed to its factual sense. Thus an allocation of the
uses and benefits of the waters of an international
watercourse between two or more States may entail a certain
degree of harm - in the factual sense of unmet needs - to
one, or usually both States, and still be 'equitable'....
Thus,.. : where there is a conflict among the water needs of
the States making beneficial use of those waters, that
conflict is to be resolved on the basis of equity, taking
all relevant factors into account" (22).
With this in mind, Professor McCaffrey indicated how
article 9 might be reworded to conform with the overriding
principle of equitable utilization. It could be done in
three ways, he said: first, by replacing the words
"appreciable harm to the rights or interests of" with the
22 .
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words "injury to"; second, by replacing the reference to
causing appreciable harm by a reference to a state exceeding
its equitable share or depriving another state of its
equitable share; and third, by the addition of an exception
clause similar to that proposed by Judge Schwebel, namely
"except as may be allowable within the context of the first
state's equitable utilization of that international
watercourse." He preferred the third solution; he thought
it would "best achieve the goals of a provision on this
subject, viz, to set forth the 'no harm' rule while making
it consistent with the principle of equitable utilization"
(23).	 In other words, he then still firmly held Judge
Schwebel's view of the law.	 pm
In 1987 he continued to maintain this position and in
this he was not alone, for opinion on the matter in the ILC
was divided (24). By then, however, the Evensen version of
article 9 was in the hands of the Drafting Committee and the
debate about the no harm rule shifted from articles 6 and 9
to other draft articles, in particular those on protection
of the environment. It is not intended to discuss these
articles here, but in Draft Article 21 the ILC has applied
the Evensen no appreciable harm rule to pollution. It was
inevitable that in the discussion leading to the adoption of
this article there would be further consideration of the
relationship of that rule to that of equitable utilization,




applies directly to Draft Articles 5 and 7 and must be taken
into account.
There was little sympathy in the ILC for arguments in
favour of a role for the principle of equitable utilization
in dealing with pollution; the notion that pollution damage
in one state should be balanced against the beneficial uses.
of another state was quickly rejected. The prevailing view
was that any pollution, widely defined, that causes or may
cause appreciable harm to the waters of an international
watercourse in the territory of another state, should be
prohibited. Nevertheless, having determined to do so, the
ILC again faced the dilemma of reconciling the no
appreciable harm rule, now applied to the particular case of
pollution, with the principle of equitable utilization
adopted in earlier Draft Article 5 as a principle of general
application. Having failed previously in its attempts to
reconcile them in Draft Articles 5 and 7, would the ILC be
more successful in doing so in the case of pollution?
Professor McCaffrey, who had defended the primacy of
equitable utilization so stoutly in the discussion of the
now numbered Draft Article 7, abandoned it when he came
pollution. In his Fourth Report in 1988, he proposed a
draft article that in substance prohibited pollution that
would cause appreciable harm to other watercourse states or
to the ecology. There was no mention of any of the three
qualifications to the wording of Draft Article 7 that in
1986 he had argued were necessary in order to reconcile the
24 .
conflict between the two rules. This is not to say that he
thought that he was denying the primacy of equitable
utilization. He, and ultimately the ILC, took the view that
harm caused by pollution was different from other kinds of
harm and, therefore, its different treatment was justified.
He put it this way:
"[In the light of] the need to protect the environment in
order to permit sustainable development and to preserve the
earth for future generations,... water uses that cause
appreciable pollution harm to other watercourse States and
the environment could well be regarded as being per se
inequitable and unreasonable.... In the view of the Special
Rapporteur, the Commission should ... [adopt] a rule of 'no
appreciable pollution harm' that is not qualified by the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. This
position is without prejudice to any decision the Commission
may take with regard to whether there should be an equitable
use exception to the general rule of 'no appreciable harm'
contained in draft article 9 [now 7]" (25).
The apparent conflict between the two principles, then,
is made to disappear by simply assuming that what runs foul
of the Draft Article prohibiting pollution, automatically
runs foul of Draft Article 5 which contains the requirement
of equitable utilization. But to deem that every polluting
use is ipso facto inequitable and unreasonable whether or
not it is in fact so, would seem to reflect an extreme and
	 /Th
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unwarranted concern for the environment and itself be
unreasonable.
There was some unease about whether this equation of
the appreciable harm rule with that of equitable utilization
in the case of pollution would by itself carry conviction.
An attempt was therefore made to give it more force, first
by an appropriate definition of "appreciable." This
equation could have been achieved by adopting a definition
that would encompasses only harm that threatens human health
or safety or poses a grave or long-lasting threat to the
environment; this harm clearly would be held to be
inequitable and unreasonable and therefore not protected by
the equitable utilization rule. Although in the end the ILC
chose not define "appreciable harm" in the Draft Articles,
its discussion of the meaning of these terms makes it clear
that it did not approve of this narrow definition.
Judge Schwebel, who first proposed that appreciable
harm be the criterion for determining unlawful use of the
waters of an international watercourse, gave in his Third
Report the sense in which he used the term "appreciable"
(26). To him it meant "more in quantity than is denoted by
'perceptible,' [but] less in quantity than ... 'serious' or
'substantial'." He added that "the effect or harm must have
at least an impact of some consequence ... in the affected
system State, but not necessarily a momentous or grave
effect," and he quoted with approval statements that "there
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must be a real impairment of use," and that "de minimis
effects" are excluded.
This Schwebel definition was adopted subsequently by
the ILC (27). Professor McCaffrey summed up the position as
follows: 11 ... the expression is intended to embody a
factual standard, compliance with which is capable of
objective determination. Thus, ... 'appreciable harm' is
harm that is significant - i.e., not trivial or
inconsequential - but is less than 'substantial.' The tern
'harm' is used in its factual sense. There must be an
actual impairment of use, injury to health or property, or a
detrimental effect on the ecology of the watercourse" (28).
This definition, it should be emphasized, was accepted by
the ILC as being applicable not only to the article on
pollution but to all the Draft Articles (29).
The second way in which the no appreciable harm rule
may be harmonized with the equitable utilization rule is by
interpreting the former rule as imposing not a standard of
strict liability but one of due diligence. And this was the
interpretation adopted by Professor McCaffrey, although he
admitted that the wording of the Draft Article in question
might lead one to conclude that "a State in which pollution
originated would be strictly liable for any appreciable harm
caused by that pollution" (30). He went on to argue that,
in order to apply the due diligence standard, one must look
at the facts to determine whether the watercourse state	 /Th
alleged to have violated the no appreciable harm rule has in
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fact failed to exercise due diligence. Fault thus becomes
the decisive factor; and thus the dispositive question will
be whether the alleged wrongdoer acted reasonably in the
circumstances; and thus considerations of equity will be
introduced. This reasoning led Professor McCaffrey to
suggest that, at least in the case of pollution, there may
be no need for a formal reconciliation of Draft Articles 5
and 7, since the outcome could be the same as if the no
appreciable harm rule were made subject to that of equitable
utilization (31).
Two comments may be made about these attempts to
persuade one that there is really no conflict between Draft
Articles 5 and 7. First, the process by which the patent
conflict between them is explained away, is one of
definition. One may ask, then, why were these definitions
not included in the articles to remove any doubts their
meaning? If it were the intention to make due diligence the
standard for engaging liability, one would have thought it a
simple matter to say so clearly. And second, the
proposition that the application of the due diligence rule
will in practice convert the no appreciable harm rule into
an equitable utilization rule is highly dubious. One senses
that Professor McCaffrey himself did not think it was valid
in cases other than pollution, for he qualified his
statement with the words "at least in relation to the
pollution of international watercourses"; and even in the
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case of pollution he spoke hesitantly, saying only that "the
outcome could be the same," not would be the same.
The legal basis of the general principles
To what extent are the general principles adopted by
the ILC in Draft Article 5 and 7 supported by legal
authority? In the case of equitable utilization, there is
ample authority for the proposition that it is now a rule of
customary interntional law. This was recognized by the
Special Rapporteurs themselves. Judge Schwebel, after an
extensive survey of the authorities and the practice of
states, concluded that "virtually all the commentators
writing in the field sustain the existence of equitable
utilization as a rule of general international law where the 	 PTh
system States have conflicting uses or plans for the further
development of their shared water resources" and that the
international community of states had accepted the rule
(32). Judge Evensen too regarded its inclusion in his
draft articles as being merely a codification of a well-
established principle of customary international law (33);
and so did Professor McCaffrey, who stated that there was
"overwhelming support for the doctrine ... as a general,
guiding principle of law for the determination of the
rights" of watercourse states (34). Their position on this
point is sound and there is no need to pursue it further.
The case of the no appreciable harm rule is quite
different. The ILC has had difficulty with it from the
outset. The source of the trouble was the belief on the
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part of the special Rapporteurs that the sic utere tuo maxim
was a fundamental principle of international law that
proscribes activities in one state that cause harm in
another and that that principle applied to the relations of
watercourse states.
Judge Schwebel espoused this view but at the same time
he recognized that it had to be qualified to make it
compatible with the principle of equitable utilization and
with the practice of states. He did this, first, by
introducing the word "appreciable" before "harm," and
second, by adding to his draft article, which is the
equivalent of Draft Article 7, the exception clause noted
above, and by starting his article on pollution with the
words "consistent with article (5) on 'equitable
[utilization]'.'! Thus he gave primacy to equitable
utilization in all cases of conflict between the two rules.
His justification of these qualifications was that one had
to be "careful to take into account the possibility of
permissible harm even of an aooreciable amount or quality
provided it falls within the context of equitable"
utilization (35). In effect, therefore, for Judge Schwebel
the sic utere tuo maxim, which he had referred to as the
basic rule under general international law, turned out not
to be a basic rule at all; harm, whether appreciable or not,
has only the status of an important fact in judging if a
utilization is equitable and reasonable.	 In the last
analysis, the test of legality is equity and reasonableness.
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Special Rapporteurs Evensen and McCaffrey also held the
pic utere tuo maxim to be a basic rule of general
international law, but they treated it differently from
Judge Schwebel. Invoking the maxim, Judge Evensen accepted
the "appreciable" but no other qualification of the no
appreciable harm rule, thus creating an irreconcilable
conflict between it and equitable utilization. Professor
McCaffrey, on the other hand, accepted both Schwebel
qualifications of the rule as it appears in Draft Article 7
as one of the principles of general application, but, in the
case of pollution, accepted only the "appreciable"
qualification and rejected the one that would have made the
rule subject to equitable utilization. As seen above, the 	 /Th
ILC decided in favour of the Evensen position.
In arguments supporting the no appreciable harm rule,
three cases are invariable given as authority for it, namely
the Corfu Channel case, the Trail Smelter arbitration, and
the Lake Lanoux arbitration. The judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case, it
is said, confirms that the maxim sic utere tuo is a basic
principle of international law which prohibits a state from
causing appreciable harm in the territory of another state.
The relevant passage of the judgment that is cited is:
"Such obligations are based ... on certain general and well-
recognized principles, namely, elementary considerations of
humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war, the
principle of freedom of maritime communication, and every
31.
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States"
(36). This is a slender reed to lean on. In the first
place, the facts bear no resemblance to those that arise in
the execution of a state's right to utilize the waters of a
watercourse in its territory; the case did not involve any
transfrontier issues or harm, but the responsibility of
Albania for damage suffered in its territorial seas by
British warships and sailors when the ships struck mines in
Corfu Channel. And second, the proposition stated by the
Court is that a state must not allow acts contrary to the
riahts of other states. One assumes that the Court would
have spoken of "harm" if that was its intent. To a lawyer,
there is a profound difference between the violation of a
right and the suffering of harm; being harmed is a fact and
it may be a violation of a right, but it is not necessarily
SO.
Professor McCaffrey, of course, acknowledged the
weakness of the Corfu Channel case as a precedent for the
law governing international watercourses (37), and yet he
seemed to find comfort in it. One is not persuaded,
however, that it contributes anything but confusion to the
task of defining the respective rights and duties of
watercourse states. In truth, the resort to the sic utere
tuo maxim as the source of a legal rule indicates that,
lacking existing law, one is about to engage in some law-
making or, to put it in modern dress, in the progressive
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development of the law, the result Of which may or may not
be justifiable. The maxim undoubtedly expresses a sound
social policy and moral rule that should underlie all law;
generally speaking, people, either individually or
collectively as a state, should avoid harming one another.
This is not to say, however, that the maxim Should be
held to embody a rule that prohibits harm, whether it be
appreciable, significant, substantial, or otherwise. Does
any but a primitive system of law have such a rule of
general application? In systems of any sophistication,
fault with few exceptions replaces strict liability; the
reasonableness of conduct becomes the test for determining
legal rights and duties. That is the test reflected in the
doctrine of equitable utilization.
Properly interpreted, therefore, the sic utere tuo
maxim would be held to proscribe legal injury and not
factual harm, and the word "right* in the quoted statement
in the Corfu Channel case would be held to mean a legal
right. One example indicating that this is the
interpretation used by states, is found in the section of
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States dealing with "State
Obligations with Respect to the Environment of Other States
and the Common Environment"; under it. "a state is obliged
... to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or
control ... are. conducted so as not to cause significaant
injury to the environment of another State..." (38).. As
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seen above, the use of "injury" intead of "harm" was one of
the changes to Draft Article 7 advocated by Professor
McCaffrey.
Of the trilogy of cases mentioned above, the Trail
Smelter arbitration is regarded as the classic case in the
field of international environmental law and it is
frequently cited in that connection. The case did not
concern water resources but air pollution, damage having
been caused in the United States by fumes from a smelter in
Canada. This fact, however, is not seen as impairing its
authority as a decisive precedent in watercourse problems,
for the tribunal purported to find the appropriate law in
the American cases on interstate waters, which, it said, was
the same as international law. The essence of that law, as
it saw it, is summed up in its much quoted statement that
"under the principles of international law ..., no State has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence" (39).
On the face of it this seems to be a clear and concise
statement of the law. But there are difficulties in
treating it as a precedent for a "no harm" rule or for a
rule of strict liability, or even as an accurate statement
of international law. First, the law as expressed in the
statement bears little resemblance to the principle of
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equitable utilization developed and applied by the Supreme
Court of the United states in interstate water disputes.
Second, even if it is an accurate statement of the law, it
prohibits only "injury," not harm, Third, it prohibits only
injury "of serious consequence," not merely appreciable harm
as the ILC's Draft Articles do. And fourth, in any event
the statement is hardly more than obiter dicta, for Canada
had agreed to pay for any damages caused in the United
States, and by their compromis the two governments had asked
the tribunal only to determine the amount of the
compensation payable and to decide whether the smelter
should be required to refrain from causing damage in the
future and, if so, to what extent.	
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Considering these things, one cannot regard the Trail 
Smelter arbitration as authority for the "no appreciable
harm" rule. Professor McCaffrey also had doubt about what
the true intent of the award was, concluding merely that it
"represents an apt illustration of a general observation of
Professor Quentin-Baxter: 'It is ... a feature of the
modern world - of which there is ample evidence in the
jurisprudence of the Court - that the resolution of disputes
between States may turn as much upon the adjustment of
competing interests as upon the ascertainment and
application of prohibitory rules" (40). Perhaps it should
be recalled here that Article IV of the compromis
establishing the tribunal in the Trail Smelter case
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expressed the desire of the parties "to reach a solution
just to all the parties concerned" (41).
The third case usually relied on in argument to support
the no appreciable harm rule is the Lake Lanoux arbitration
(France v. Spain) decided in 1957 (42); of the three cases,
it is the only one that deals with an international
watercourse. When France proposed a diversion of some of
the waters of Lake Lanoux to another drainage basin in its
territory and then a return of at least an equal amount of
water to the Lake Lanoux basin before its waters flowed into
Spain, the Spanish government objected. It claimed that the
project would infringe its rights under the Treaty of
Bayonne of 1866 and the Additional Act of the same date and
thus could not be undertaken without its consent. The award
of the tribunal, therefore, is based on the application of
these treaties.
Nevertheless, it throws light on some of the general
principles of the law on international watercourses,
particularly on the procedural rules. In this respect ', the
case strongly supports the planned measures section of the
ILC's Draft Articles. As for general principles, its main
contribution to them is to emphasize that a watercourse
state does not have a veto over the projects of the other
watercourse states; its consent is not required. Apart from
that, as Professor Lammers has written, the tribunal's
statements "did not go beyond noting the generally
recognized necessity to take the interests of other riparian
36 .
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States into consideration and to reconcile conflicting
interests brought into play by the industrial use of
international watercourses through mutual concessions" (43).
In particular, again to use the words of Professor Lammers,
"the Tribunal was able to avoid a finding regarding the
validity under general international law of the principle
that a riparian State may not use the waters of an
international watercourse in such a manner that serious
injury is caused to other riparian States" (44).
It is surprising, therefore, to find a passage in
Professor McCaffrey Second Report stating that the tribunal
in the Lakft_Iammx case had held that, "although it had no
application to the facts of the case, 'there is a rule 	 (Th
prohibiting the upper riparian State from altering the
waters of a river in circumstances calculated to do serious
injury to the lower riparian State' " (45). The same
statement is repeated in his Fourth and Fifth Reports (46).
The inconsistency between this conclusion and that of
Professor Lammers apparently arises from a minor but crucial
incosistency in the texts relied on.
The Special Rapporteur supported his view of the case
with the following quotation purporting to come from the
award: "[W]hile admittedly there is a rule prohibiting the
upper riparian State from altering the waters of a river in
circumstances calculated to do serious injury to the lower
riparian State, such a principle has no application to the
present case ..." (47). And this quotation is repeated in
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exactly the same terms in the commentary to article 8 (now
Draft Article 7) among the authorities cited in support of
the "well-established no appreciable harm" rule (48). It is
not, however, altogether accurate. When the quoted passage
is examined in the report of the case in the Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards and in International Law
Reports, it is found that in the former the opening words
are "Thus, even if it is admitted ..." and in the latter
"Thus, if it is admitted ..." (49). The statement of the
tribunal, therefore, is conditional; it did not admit
anything about a no harm rule. Incidentally, even if it had
so admitted, the word used in the award is "injury," not
"harm," and the word qualifying harm was "serious," not
"appreciable," so to that extent the ILC paid no heed to the
case that it thought was authoritative.
In short, these three cases, the pillars on which the
ILC's "no appreciable harm" rule in Draft Article 7 rests,
do not support it. The other authorities called in aid by
the ILC are treaties, diplomatic exchanges, and the
resolutions and declarations of various conferences and
intergovernmental	 and	 international	 non-governmental
organizations, and individual experts (50). It is
questionable, however, whether all of these instruments
really do reflect customary international law. Observe, for
example, the practice of two states party to a treaty with
an explicit provision prohibiting transfrontier harm.
Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between
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Canada and the United States (51) provides that "the waters
herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across
the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the
injury of health or property on the other." From the time
of that treaty until today, however, the boundary waters in
question, especially the Great Lakes, have beenseriously
polluted and they continue to be polluted contrary to
Article IV.
This experience with Article IV suggests that an
absolute "no harm" rule, or any such rule with a low
threshold of entry, is not successful in reconciling the
"conflicting interests brought into play by the industrial
use of international watercourses" (52). In fact, in the	 CM
case of the Great Lakes, Canada and the United States had to
enter into a new treaty, the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1972 (revised in 1978) (53), in an attempt to
halt and reverse the degradation of their waters. This
treaty in effect modifies Article IV of the Boundary Waters
Treaty by giving a narrower and more realistic definition of
"pollution" as used in it.
&Plying the "no appreciable harm" rule 
The real contradiction that exists between Draft
Articles 5 and 7, that is to say, between the principle of
equitable utilization and the no appreciable harm rule may
be illustrated by considering the Flathead River case. This
river flows from south-eastern British Columbia into north-
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western Montana. When a company proposed to establish a
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coal mine on Cabin Creek, a tributary of the Flathead River
in British Columbia, there were objections to the project
and the Canadian and United States governments referred the
matter to the International Joint Commission (IJC) under
Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty for study. In
December 1988, the IJC submitted its report and
recommendations to the governments (54).
Relying on the technical assessment of a Study Board
established by it, the IJC recommended that the governments
not approve the projected mine. While noting that the
available data were incomplete, it felt confident in holding
that the operation of the mine would violate the no
injurious pollution rule of Article IV of the Boundary
Waters Treaty, or at least that it carried the risk of that
violation. In particular, the IJC concluded that damage
would inevitably occur to the habitat, which would cause a
significant loss of the fish population. And this loss, it
said, "would be such as to cause a reduction in the quantity
and quality of the sport fishing activity in the United
States and create a negative impact on the associated
economic infrastructure since the affected fish population
migrate for much of their adult lives to United States
waters" (55). The IJC, however, indicated that its
conclusion was "not based on the dollar losses ..., although
... there will be demonstrable and sustained economic loss
to a number of interests dependent on this fishery," but on
the ground that "a reduction of the fish population ...
40.
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would undoubtedly be an injury of most serious consequence
to the integrity of the fishery itself, and thus to that
property interest in the public domain on the other side of
the border" (56).
This conclusion was dictated by the strict no injury
rule of Article IV. Would the same conclusion have been
reached if the governing rule were that of equitable
utilization? The IJC itself perhaps indicated otherwise,
for its final recommendation to the governments was that
they "consider, with the appropriate jurisdictions,
opportunities for defining and implementing compatible,
equitable and sustainable development activities and
management strategies in the upper Flathead River basin"	
(Th
(57). The fact of the matter is that the IJC was precluded
by the no injury rule of Article IV from itself attempting
to reach an equitable and reasonable balancing of the
conflicting interests of the parties. If it had been free
to do so, it might well have found in favour of the project;
for, while the evidence established that the fish population
would be reduced, it did not show that the fishery would
suffer any long-term or irreversible damage. Furthermore,
while the negative impact of the project on sport fishing
and on the associated economic infrastructure was remarked
on, there was no mention of the impact of a rejection of the
project on the economy of British Columbia and Canada. Even
under the ILC i s Draft Article 6, these are relevant factors
	 pm
that must be taken into account in determining the equitable
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and reasonable manner of utilization of an international
watercourse.
The Flathead River demonstrates the limits imposed by a
no harm rule on those called upon to apply it in a
watercourse case; in the last analysis, they cannot ensure
that their decision or recommendation, as the case may be,
is equitable and reasonable. This is so even if the rule is
qualified by words such as "appreciable," unless one is
prepared to give them such a meaning that the rule becomes
equivalent to that of equitable utilization.
Although, as seen above, there was some suggestion in
the proceedings of the ILC that the apparent conflict
between the two rules in Draft Articles 5 and 7 was not
real, in its commentary to Article 7 the ILC did acknowledge
that in some instances the application of the no appreciable
harm rule might not achieve an equitable and reasonable
utilization; in that case, it wrote, the necessary
accommodations would be arrived at through specific
agreements. It added: "Thus, a watercourse State may not
justify a use that causes aappreciable harm to another
watercourse State on the ground that the use is 'equitable',
in the absence of agreement between the watercourse States
concerned" (58). This is a frank admission of the existence
of a real conflict between the two articles.
Conclusion
In its Draft Articles 11 to 19 on planned measures, the
ILC has elaborated the customary international law
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applicable to states in their utilization of the waters of
an international watercourse. In doing so, it has developed
this law progressively and the result should prove to be
acceptable to states.
On the other hand, the ILC has not been so successful
in defining the general principles of law applicable to
international watercourses. Its formulation of the
principles dealing with equitable utilization (Articles 5
and 6), the duty to cooperate (Article 8) and exchange data
and information regularly (Article 9), and the relationship
between uses (Article 10) reflect current law. The novelty
comes in Article 7 which effectively makes no appreciable
harm the primary rule of international water resources law,
relegating the principle of equitable utilization to a
subordinate role. This change in the law is profound. As
seen above, it was done contrary to the recommendations of
Special Rapporteurs Schwebel and McCaffrey, and with divided
opinion in the ILC.
In defence of Article 7, it may be argued that in
practice the conflict between it and that of equitable
utilization is more apparent than real because watercourse
states will settle their disputes by agreement anyway. This
argument is hardly persuasive. First, it invites the
response that, if the rule will have no effect in practice,
it should not be included in the Draft Articles. . Second,
the notion that the rule will have no effect in practice is
inaccurate. For example, if the parties to a watercourse
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dispute fail to reach agreement and the issue is submitted
to an adjudicative body, that body will be bound to apply
the rule, as it would be the law; in these circumstances,
the rule will be of the utmost significance.
Furthermore, the no appreciable harm rule will
significantly influence the course of the consultations and
negotiations required by the Draft Articles on planned
measures, for the states involved, being aware of the rule,
will fashion their policies and arguments in the light of
it. Thus, while it is natural for a downstream state to
argue that the implementation of a project in the upstream
state will cause harm in its territory and, therefore, will
be a violation of its rights, the existence of the rule in
Draft Article 7 will tend to reenforce that state's
subjective view of its rights and lead it to be stubborn in
their defence in negotiations.
Apart from the effect of the rule just mentioned, the
reality is that it does alter significantly the law
concerning existing uses. Under current law, existing uses
are only one of the factors, but of course an important
factor, in determining whether or not a project is in
conformity with the principle of equitable utilization, and
they do not have any inherent preference or priority (59).
A state, therefore, may have to tolerate some harm,
certainly some appreciable harm and perhaps even serious
harm, if it is necessary to achieve an equitable and
reasonable result. Draft Article 7 changes that law; under
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it, no appreciable harm could be inflicted on an existing
use.
In short, Draft Article 7 resurrects the discredited
doctrine of prior appropriation; it entrenches the rights of
those who first utilize the waters of an international
watercourse. While this doctrine is popular with downstream
states, where first developments usually take place, it is
politically and legally unacceptable to upstream states. In
practice, it may be invoked in negotiations, but it is not
accepted or applied as a principle od law in the settlement
of watercourse disputes.
Draft Article 7 1 therefore, should be seen as an
abberation. There is merit in retaining it, but only with
the addition of the exception clause advocated by Judge
Schwebel anf Professor McCaffrey, that is to say, a clause
that would make the no appreciable harm rule subordinate to
the principle of equitable utilization. Otherwise, it
should be deleted. It is retrogressive, not progressive
development of the law of international watercourses. The
international community should not accept a law whose
application may in some instances result in decisions that
will be inequitable and unreasonable. The proper touchstone
for determining the legal validity of utilizations of the
waters of international watercourses should be the
reasonable use and management of these waters, judged in the
light of all relevant factors.
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